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Common Plea8 of Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania.
ROBERT MITCHELL vs.

THE PENNSYLVANIA R. R. COMPANY.

1. One employee or servant has no right of action against the principal or master
for an injury sustained through the negligence of another employee or servant in
the same service.
2. When a Rail Road Company places in the hands of one that it employs, when he
isemployed, printed rules and regulations to which he is required to conform if he
enters into their service or employment, one of which is, that "the regularcompenzation will cover all risk or liabilityfrom any cause whatever, in the service of the Company," that becomes an expre8s provision of the contract, by which he waives all
claim for any injury received in such service.

This was an action on the case, tried at August Term, 1853, in
which the plaintiff claimed damages from the Pennsylvania Rail
Road Company, for injuries received in a collision between a burden and passenger train on the 25th of July, 1851. The facts are
sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.
.McAllister, Wilson, and _Petriken, for Plaintiff.
Miles and .Dorris,for the Pennsylvania R. R..Company.
The charge of the Court was as follows, by
TAYLOR, P. J.-The plaintiff claims daIages for injuries received
in a collision of a passenger and a freight train upon the Pennsylvania Rail Road, on the 25th of July, 1851.
There is no room for controversy about any question of fact
material in the decision of the case. That the collision occurred,
and that the plaintiff was very seriously injured, so-that he was
afterwards confined to his room, under the care of a physician, and
was disabled for a considerable time from engaging in any other
employment, are facts clearly proven and not disputed. The testimony of the physician examined tends strongly, indeed, to show
that the injuries complained of are such as are likely to render
him, to some extent, disabled through life.
That the accident
happened through the negligence or mismanagement of the conduc-
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tor of the burden train, seems also to be sufficiently established.
If, therefore, thsIlaintiff had been a paseenger upon the train, his
case would be clearly made out, and -you would have little else to
do than to assess his damages. But, instead of being a passenger,
or one whom the company had undertaken to carry, he was himself
an employee or servant of the Company, and was at the time of
the accident engaged in its service as baggage-master on the passenger train: and it is urged; in defence, that there is no rule of
law or principle of policy recognized by the law, which gives him
any right of action. And, in the absence of any difficulty about
the facts, the case must turn upon the law governing it.
Although we have no decision of it by our own Supreme Court,
the point here presented can scarcely be regarded as an open question; for other Courts, of the highest respectability, both in this
Country and in England,- have considered and decided it; and
upon grounds so consonant with reason and correct principle, and so
obviously just and politic, that their accuracy is not likely any
where to be successfully questioned. The whole current of reported
cases is to the effect that one employee or servant has no right of
actlon against the principal or master for an injury. sustained
throughthe negligence of another employee or servant in the same
service. It was so ruled in England, (Priestly vs. 1owler, 3 Mee.
and W. 8,) in 1837. The same doctrine has since been affirmed
there, and held here in Massachusetts, South Carolina, and New
York. In 1844, the question was taken before the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts, in Farwellvs. The Boston and Worcester B. B.
Company, 4 Met. 49, a case not substantially different in its facts, and
in no way distinguishable in principle, from the case now before this
Court. It was viewed as a case of "first impression" in that- State,
and of great importance, and it *as, therefore, very carefully considered; and the Court, in an elaborate opinion by Chief Justice
SHAW, adopted the rule which had been established by the English
Courts, and -whichhad been elsewhere held in this Country. That
case is cited with approval, and the principal ruled, given as the law,
by Mr. Story in his Treatise on Contracts, (§ 428) a work of high
authority, not only here, but as shown in one of the cases here
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read, (70 En. C. L., 454,) in the English Courts, and by their
judges.
Still more recently, in 1851, the same principle was
affirmed in England, in Hutchinson's .Executorvs. The York, .Newcastle, and Branch B. B. Company, 5 Ex. Rep., 344; a case in
which, as in the present, the injury resulted from a collision through
the unskillful or negligent management of one of the traing, and,
in its general and material facts, resembling the case now before us.
Again, and nearer home, the same question was ruled in the
same way, upon the authority of the leading cases now referred to
by Judge LoWRIE, in the District Court of Allegheny County.
8trange vs. MAfc~ormick, 10 American Law Journal, 398. In view
of all these highly respectable authorities, opposed by no reputed
case, we could not regard the question as unsettled, even if thefi.
reasoning did not commend itself to the approval of our own
judgment; and we have no hesitation in stating the rule which they
lay down to be the law.
It requires, indeed, as it seems to us, either sympathy for the
sufferer, in an individual case of much apparent hardship, or prejudice against an incorporated Company, to bias any one into doubt
of the reasonableness and justice of the law thus settled. And as
similar risks exist in every business requiring a plurality of operatives, and as accountability on the part of the employer would have
a tendency to increase rather than diminish them, this rule adopted
by the Courts in the application of settled legal principles, is not
only in itself just and reasonable, but is sanctioned by considerations of policy. We are all in danger hourly, either from our own
Almost
carelessness or want of foresight of others around us.
every step through life is one of peril. The prosecution of every
employment or business has its incident risks, with which one enga..
ging in it is fairly supposed to be as well acquainted as his employer, and which it is but reasonable to say he undertakes to
encounter. Without'any express stipulation on the subject, it is
a part of his contract. Otherwise, almost every contract of hiring
would include in it a contract of insurance against the casualties,
(so to speak,) of life. If you should employ two men to dig you a
well, or fell your timber, or work your thrashing machine, it would
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be at- the risk of having one of them, through the fault Ox negligence of the other, and without an fault of yonrs, a pension upon
you to the- end of his days.- - And besides, as i justly said- by
Lord Ainnef, in prietly vs. Fowkr "the servant is not bound
t. ik his afety in the service of, his master, and may,. if 'he thinks
fit, -declire any'seryie' in, -which he reasonably.apprehends- injury
to himself: -and, in-most-of- the cases. in whichdanger may be incurred, if not all, he is just,-ms likely to, be acquainted witlh the
probability and extent of it,-as his master." So here, Mr. Mitchell acted voluntarily. and also knowingly; for he,- or any 'one sufficiently acquainted with the business, t6 take upon himself the duties
of brakeman or baggage-master, knew quite as well as any stockholder in the Company, that the road had but one track; that,
with the utmost care and skill that could be secured, there was
danger of accidental, collisions; and that, if entire safety would
be attained by the constant and unremitting vigilance of two thousand men in different-departments of the service, that, in-.the very
nature ofthings, could not be expected., No effort. or precaution of
any Company employing so many men, though stimulated to watchfulness by the most powerful -motive of interst, -the reputation of
their road, the safety of their own property, and strict accountability for every valuable thing they carry for others,-could possiblyguard against an occasional transgression of rules, through the
negligence, recklessness, dud even the occasional inebriety, of some
of its numerous employees. There are, then, risks of the service,
as apparent to any one who will reflect, as the breaking of a wheel
or, an axle; and risks which every 'one undertakes to encounter
when. he enters into the service, and against which there is and
should be, no implied guaranty by the employer. "The principle
is," says ALDERsoN, B., in Rutchinson vs. Mhe York, fc., Raiway, "that a servant, when. he engages to serve a master, undertakes' as between him and his master, to run all the ordinary risks
of the service, and this includes the risk of negligence on the part
of a fellow evant, whenever he is acting in discharge of his duty
as servant of him who is the common master of both."
The present case, -however, if it were necessary to push the inquiry further, does not depend upon the implication resulting from
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the relations of the parties. The Pennsylvania Rail Road Com1any, as it appears by the testimony of Mr. Haupt, place in the
hands of every man it employs, when he is employed, a printed
book. of rules and regulations, to which he is required to conform,
if he enters into their employment; one of which is, that "the
regular compensation will cover all risk or liability FRoM ANY
That, then, in
CAUSE WHATEVER in the service of the Company."
every such case, becomes an express provision of the contract.
Austin vs. The Manchester Rail Road, 70 English Com. L. 454.
A copy of that book, it seems, was in the hands of the plaintiff.
If so, his claim is not only in opposition to the rule of law, which
reason, justice, and policy deduce from the relation of the parties,
but to his own express contract.
But it is contended that there was, here, gross negligence on the
part of the Company, which distinguishes this case from any of
the caes cited: that McBride, the conductor of the burden train,
was an intemperate man; that that fact was proven to the Company who still retained him; and that, therefore, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover. Whether, if the Pennsylvania Rail Road Company, or any other
Company would employ and keep in their service an intemperate
or incompetent servant, they would or would not be answerable to
another employee or servant for the consequences of an injury
happening by means of his intemperance or incompetency, it is not
necessary for us to decide; for there is no evidence here upohn
which we could submit that question to the jury. There is no evidence that the characterof McBride was that of an intemperate
man; or that his occasional drunkenness was known to the Company;
and no evidence, whatever, that he was drunk at the time of the
collision, or on that day; or that the collision happened
through his intemperance. He had been employed upon the
road six or seven months. The only evidence of his intemperance
is the testimony of Thomas Burchinell and Grafius Miller. Mr. B.,
who boarded with him at the same public house near Hollidaysburg,
saw him once excited by liquor, when he was "lying over," or off
duty, and that the day before the accident; and he was "surprised"
46
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at it, for he had always considered him a sober man. Miller, who
wa also a conductor of a burden train, saw him drunk once the
month before the accident, when he met some friends on some public
Qoasion, in Lancaster. Does this testimony show that McBride's
characterwas that of an intemperate man, so that the Company
should have known it ?-or, does it not- prove the reverse? - Besides, neither of these witnesses of the plaintiff, or any one else,
proves that either of these twu occasions of indulgence was made
known to any stockholder of the Company, or any officer representing it, or whose business and duty it was to apply a corrective.
But the plaintiff says it was the duty of his witness, Miller, to
have done so, and that he is presumed to have done his duty, and
that the Company is presumed to have been informed on the subject. It might be answered, that (since the use of intoxicating
liquors is prescribed by the printed rules and regulations,) it was
the duty of somebody, who it is equally to be presumed did hki
duty, to dismiss him upon a knowledge of the fact; but he remained
on the road, although it appeared to be the constant aim, as it was
the highest interest of the Company, to have only sober men in
their service. The most reasonable conclusion, therefore, is, that
in this, Mr. Miller did not do his duty; and, if he had done it, the
plaintiff, inoreover, would probably have proved it by him. Nor
would it distinguish the case if the accident happened through -the
negligence of Miller in not giving such notice to the Company.
But what is decisive in this matter, is, that there is an entire absence
of proof that .McBridewas drunk at the time, and that the accident
and the injury were results of hi8 drunkenness. On the contrary,
the only evidence on the point, tends to show that he was not
drunk. Isaac Furlin, who had seen and spoken to him a very short
time before, and who says, "he always appeared to be a sober,
steady man," says he then noticed nothing unusual about him.
In no view, then, which can be taken of the facts of this case,
can the action be maintained; and your verdict, gentlemen, should
be for the defendant.
Verdict for the defendant.'
IExceptions

were filed, and the case will go to the Supreme Court.
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In the Spryeme Court of Ohio, January, 1853.
JAMES TEAFF vs. SAMUEL HEWITT, et al.
1. A fixture is an article which was a chattel, but which, by being annexed ot
affixed to the realty, became accessory to it, and parcel of it.
2. The true criterion of a fixture is the united application of the following requisites,
to wit: 1. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto.
2. Application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty with which
it is connected, is appropriated. 3. The intention of the party making the
annexation, to make a permanent accession to the freehold.
S. The criterion of a fixture applicable to machinery in a mill or manufactory, is
not different from that which applies to articles affixed to the freehold in any other
situation.
4. A mill or manufactory, including all its essential parts, may unite in the same
business, and for producing a common result, portions of real estate, with articles
of personal property retaining all the essential qualities of chattels.
5. The machinery in a woollen factory, consisting of carding machines, spinning machines, power looms, &c., connected with the motive power of the steam engine by
bands and straps, but in no wise attached to the building in which used, except
by qleats, or other means to confine them to their proper places for use, and subject to removal whenever convenience or business may require without injury, are
not fixtures, but chattel property.
6. The legal qualities of articles attached to the realty, may be fixed or ascertained
from the agreement and understanding of parties; and a sale and cgnveyance of
a mill or manufacturing establishment as uch, by any general name, or terms of
description commonly understood to embrace all its essential parts, passes the
machinery belonging to such mill or establishment, whether affixed to the freehold or not; but otherwise, if the language is merely descriptive of the reality
with its appurtenances.

The opinion of the Court in which the facts appear, was delivered by
BARTLEY, C. J.-This is a suit in chancery, instituted by James
Teaff, in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, against
Samuel Hewitt and sundry others, as creditors of said Hewitt, for
the appraisement and sale of certain mortgaged premises, to satisfy
a claim of complaint against Hewitt; and, also, to enjoin sundry
judgment creditors of Hewitt, from detaching certain alleged parts
of the mortgaged premises, consisting of the machinery of a woolen
manufactory, and selling the same on execution as chattel property.
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the bill was filed and an injunction allowed October 1st, A. D. 1849.
This injunction was, subsequently, on motion, dissolved.
The mortgage describes the mortgaged premises, as "lot No. 322,
in Viers' addition to the town of Steubenville, on which, is erected a
woolen manufactory," and conveys the lot with the appurtenances,
&c. The condition of the mortgage was, that if Hewitt paid certain
notes when they became due, and kept Teaff from any loss, costs
or damages, by reason of the same, then the mortgage to be void,
otherwise in full force. And on the day of the execution of this
mortgage, it appears that Teaff took a chattel mortgage on the
machinery in controversy, which was duly recorded, but not renewed so as to preserve its lien under the statute.
The dissolution of the injunction extended to the machinery, consisting of the carding mechines, spinning machines, power looms,
and other appendages thereof, which were connected with the
motive power of the steam engine by bands and straps, but the injunction was continued as to the steam engine and boilers.
The questions presented by this case for determination, are as
follows:
1. Does the appeal from the decree of the August Term, 1850,
open up the merits of the case touching the property as to which
the injunction had been dissolved?
2. Was the property, relative to which the injunction was dissolved, parcel of the realty, or was it chattel property ?
8. If the latter, and the property had not diminished in value in
consequence of the injunction, but had been, after the dissolution
of the injunction, sold on execution, and the proceeds applied on
the judgments, were the defendants entitled to any decree against
the complainant, for the amount of their judgments and the penalty?
Of these in their order.
1. An. appeal from a decree is nothing else than a proceeding in
the original cause, which continues the case by vacating or suspending the decree till the final hearing in the appellate Court. The
55th section of the law of March 10, 1831, directing the mode of
proceeding in chancery, 29 0. L. 81, authorized an appeal to the

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court under the former Constitution of the State, from
any final sentence or decree in chancery, in the Court of Common
Pleas, on the terms prescribed. A final decree is one which determines and disposes of the whole merits of the cause before the
Court, or of a branch of a cause which is separate and distinct
from the other parts of the case, reserving no further questions or
directions for future determination, so that it will not be necessary
to bring the cause, or that separate branch of the cause, again
before the Court for further decision. It is true, that after final
decree defining and settling the rights of the parties, further orders
or decrees may become necessary to carry into effect the rights
settled by the final decree, on the merits, such as a decree confirming a sale, or confirming the proceedings or report of a Master,
carrying into effect the terms of a final decree. This, however, is
a subsequent proceeding, and only auxiliary to or in execution of
the final decree, upon the merits of the case. And an appeal from
a decree in this subsequent proceeding, brings nothing before the
Court, except the proceedings which follow the final determination
of the merits. Hrey vs. Schooley et al, 7 Ohio Rep. 49; 5 Cranch.
313; 10 Wheat. 442. An interlocutory decree is one which leaves
the equity of the case, or some material question connected with it,
for future determination. Where the further action of the Court is
necessary to give the complete relief contemplated by the Court
upon the merits, the decree under which the further question arises,
is to be regarded not as final, but as interlocutory, Cocke vs. Gilpin,
1 Rob. Ya. 20.
The case before us presents a double aspect for the subject-matter
of a decree. The object of the bill was to settle the mortgaged
premises, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the payment of
Hewitt's indebtedness to complainant, and also to enjoin the proceedings under the judgments of the other creditors of Hewitt, and
prevent the sale of the machinery in the manufactory as chattel
property, which the complainant claimed to be a part of the realty,
and to be covered by his mortgage. After the dissolution of the
injunction, as to all the machinery except the steam engine and
boilers, the respondents, who were judgment creditors of Hewitt,
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sold* the property as to which the injunction was dissolved, on
execution, and applied the proceeds on their judgments. At the May
'Term of the Common Pleas, 1850, Teaff, the complainant, took his
decree upon one branch of the case, against Hewitt, for the amount
of 'his debt, with interest and costs of suit, and in default of the
payment of the same for the appraisement and sale of the mortgaged premises, including the steam engine and boilers, as to which
the injunction had not been dissolved. The decree upon this branch
of the case, at that term, waa complete and final; no further action
of the Court was requisite. The defendants did not appeal from
this decree, but acquiesced in it; and this part of the case is not
now in controversy, as it appears, between the parties.
But as to the other branch of the case, the Court at that term
extended the dissolution of the injunction to the defendants who
'had answered the bill subse4uent to the preceding term, and referred
the cause to a MJaster to take testimony and report under special
instructions ai the next term, touching the value of the machinery
as to which the injunction was dissolved, at the time the injunction
was granted: what it would have sold for on execution, had no
injunction been granted; whether the same had been sold by the
sheriff on execution after the dissolution of the injunction, and if
so, upon whose executions, to whom sold, and for what amount, the
amount of the judgments enjoined, their priority as to liens, the
amount yet due thereon and the transfers of said judgments, if
any, since their renditions, and to whom made, &c. The main
question touching the rights of the parties involved in this branch of
the case, was left for the future action of the Court on the coming
in of the report of the Master. The decision that the steam engine
and boilers, as to which the injunction had not been dissolved, were
i.tures and covered by the mortgage, and the order for their sale
as a part of the' mortgaged premises, did not determine the rights
of the parties in the property as to whibh the injunction had been
dissolved. That; property Lad been detached and sold on execution
prior to this decree, and was not, therefore, in a situation to be
appraised and sold under the mortgage, if even it had belonged to
the realty. And whether the complainant, was in equity entitled
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to a decree against the defendants who had caused the property to
be sold on execution, or if properly so sold, what decree, if any,
the defendants were entitled to against the complainant, was left
for future determination. And at the August Term, 1850, the
Court determined this branch of the case, by finding that the
defendants had not abandoned their levies, and by rendering decree against the complainant, for the balance on the defendants'
judgments, with interest and the penalty of five per cent., besides
the costs of suit. From this decree, the complainant might well
appeal, and the appeal opens up the whole merits touching this
branch of the case, at least between' him and the judgment
creditors.
2. Was the property in controversy covered by the mortgage on
the realty, or was it chattel property? This is the main question
in the case, and one of great importance.
The bill and answers, which are under oath, furnish the only
testimony to be found in the case, as to the nature and description
of the property, the mode of its annexation, and the purpose for
which it was annexed to the realty, all of which appear in the
statement of the case, (but which are here omitted on account of
their length, not being deemed essential to an understanding of the
case.)
It appears that the boilers were bolted upon timbers which were
planted in the earth, with a brick furnace built under them, and
adapted to their use; but they rested upon the timbers to which
they were bolted, and by which they were supported, rather than
upon the brick work. The steam engine was fastened upon timbers
which rested for their foundation, on a stone wall laid in the earth.
The other machinery, consisting of carding machines, spinning
machines, power looms &c., was connected with the motive power
of the steam engine, by means of bands and straps, and attached
- to the building only so far as to confine the different parts in their
proper places for use. It appears from the answers, that such
machinery as carding machines and spinning machines and power
.looms, &c., is generally fastened to the floor by cleats or other
similar modes of attachment, for the purpose of keeping the
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various parts steady and in a suitable position for use; but that
they are easily detached, as were these, without injury to the
machinery itself, or the building; and that such machinery is
usually subject to be removed from one part of the building to
another, to suit 'convenience, and sometimes sold, and other
machinery supplied to take its place, whenever the interest of the
business for -which it is used, may require.
The doctrine of -fixtures, by which the nature and legal incidents
of this property must be determined, is involved in no inconsiderable
degree of uncertainty, and not settled by consistent and clearly
defined principles of general application. It rests upon a long
course of judicial decisions, made at different periods of time, and
under a variety of circumstances, any running into numerous
complex and conflicting distinctions arising out of the peculiar
relation of the parties, and the peculiar circumstances of each
particular case, so that it has been found extremely difficult to reduce
this branch of the law to any consistent and uniform system.
According to the decisions, an article may 'be a fixture, constituting a part of the realty as between vendor and vendee, which
would not, under like circumstances be such as between landlord
and tenant; so also, an article may be such fixture as between
heir and executor, which, under like circumstances of annexation,
would not be such as between tenant for life, and the femainderman
or reversioner. And also, according to the decisions, an article
affixed to the premises for purposes merely agricultuiral, may pass
by a conveyance of the freehold as a fixture, which would not be
such fixture under like annexation, if erected or affixed for the
purposes of trade or manufacture; and an article attached to the
realty, may be removable at one period of time as a chattel, which,
with the same annexation at ahother period, would not be removable,
because it donstituted a part of the realty. In some cases, it has
been determined; that in order to constitute a fixture, the article.
should be so united by physical annexation to the land, or to
some substance: previously belonging thereto, that it cannot be
detached without injury to the property; while in other cases,
articles 'have been determined to be fixtures, and as such, to pass
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by a conveyance of the freehold, -with but a slight attachment to
the realty, and in some instances, without any actual, but by simply
a constructive attachment.
The term fixture itself, although always applied to articles of
the nature of personal property, which have been affixed to land,
has been used with different significations, until it has become a
term of ambiguous meaning. And this ambiguity, which has
attended the use of this word in various adjudications, and by
different writers, has been productive of much of the uncertainty
which has perplexed investigations falling under this branch of the
law. The term fixture has been used by various writers, and in
numerous reported decisions, as denoting personal chattels annexed
to land, which may be severed and removed against the will of the
owner of the freehold, by the party who has annexed them, or his
personal representatives. Amos & Ferard on the Law of Fixtures,
2; Gibbons' Ianuel of the law of Fixtures, 2; Grady's Law of
Fixtures, 1; 2 Bouvier's Institutes 'of American Law, 162; 2
Kent's Com. 344.
There may be some propriety in this definition of the term when
conifined in its application to the relation of landlord and tenant,
or tenant for life, or years and remainderman or reversioner, to
which several of the elementary authors have chiefly confined their
attention. But it does not appear to express the accukate meaning
of the term in its general application. An article attached to the
realty, but which is removable against the will of the owner of the
land, has not lost the nature and incidents of chattel property. It
is still movable property, passes to the executor, and not to the
heir, on the death of the owner, may be taken on execution and
sold as other chattels, &c. A removable fixture, as a term of
general application, is a solecism-a contradiction in words.
There does not appear to be any necessity or propriety in classifying movable articles, which may be for temporary purposes somewhat attached to the land, under any general denomination distinguishing them from other chattel property. A tree growing
upon the soil, or any other article belonging to the freeholl, may be
converted into a chattel by a severance from the land.
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It is an ancient maxim of the law, that whatever becames fixed
to the realty, thereby becomes accessory to the freehold, -and partakes of all its legal incidents and properties, and cannot be severed
and removed without the consent of the owner. Quicquid plantatur solo 8olo cedit, is the language of antiquity in which the
maxim has been expressed. The term fixture, in its ordinary signification, is expressive of the act of annexation, and denotes the
change which has occurred in the nature and legal incidents of the
property, and appears to be not only appropriate, but necessary to
distinguish this class of property from movable property possessing
the nature and incidents of chattels. It is in this sense that the
term is used, in far the greater part of the adjudicated cases. 10
H. 7 pl. 2; Co. Lit. 53, a. 4; Co. 53; 2 Smith's Leading Cases,
114; Chancellor Kent's Note, (a.) 2 Kent's Com. 845; ludly vs.
Ward, Ambl, 113; .ElweB vs. Maws, 3"East. 57.
It is said that this rule has been greatly relaxed by exceptions to
it, established in favor of trade, and also in favor of the tenant, as
between landlord and tenant. And the attempt to establish the
whole doctrine of fixtures upon these exceptions to the general rule,
has occasioned much confusion and misunderstanding on this subject,
Amos and Ferard, in their treatise on the law of fixtures, mention the division of the subject into removable and irremovable
fixtures, and give a definition of each class. (See Amos and Ferard on Fixtures, p. 11.) And they remark: "that it is difficult to
determine in which of the above senses it is most frequently employed." This classification of fixtures may be essential to a correct understanding of the double sense in which the term has been
frequently used in the authorities, but it would not seem to be
needed for any other purpose,
The civil law has been commended for its simple and natural
classification of property into the obvious and universal distinction
of, things movable and things immovable, things tangible and
things intangible. Whatever would be movable property by the
civil law, would fall under the denomination of chattels personal by
the common law. And everything attached to the freehold, perpetui
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usus causa belonged to the res immobiles of the civil law. Taylor's
Elements of the Civil Law, 475. This simple division of property
seems to be founded in reason and the nature of things.
The great difficulty which has always perplexed investigation
upon this subject, has been the want of some certain, settled and
unvarying standard, by which it could be determined what amounts
to a fixture, or what connexion with the land will deprive a chattel
of its peculiar legal qualities as such, and make it accessory to the
freehold. Fixtures belong to that class of property which stands
upon the boundary line between the two grand divisions of things
real and things personal, into which the law has classified property;
a distinction not merely artificial, but founded on reason and the
nature of things-regarding not only the natural qualities of immobility on the one hand, and mobility on the other, but also the legal
constitution and incidents to which each class respectively is subject. In the great order of nature, when we compare a thing at
the extremity of one class with a thing at the extremity of another,
the difference is glaring; but when we approach the connecting
link between the two great divisions, it is often difficult to discover
the precise point where the dividing line is drawn.
There are some matters having their foundation in things real,
which are, nevertheless, by the principles of the common law, attended with some of the qualities of things personal, and therefore
termed chattels real, such as estates less than freehold, easements,
rents, emblements, &c. These, however, are easily identified,
and have no connection with fixtures. And again, there are others,
which, though movable in their nature, and apparently falling
within the definition of things personal, are, in respect of their
legal qualities, of the nature of things real. Belonging to this
class, are heir-looms, and things in the nature of heir-looms, which,
by special custom, pass with the inheritance; also, animals ferce
naturce, not domesticated so as to fall under the denonhination of
chattels, yet so confined to the realty as to become appurtenant to
it,-such as deer in a park, pigeons in a pigeon-house, conies in a
warren, fish in a pond, &c. ; also, articles sometimes called fixtures,
on the principle ot constructive attachment, such as the deeds and
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other papers which constitute the muniments of title to the land,the keys of a house, &c;, which belong to realty; and asS with it,
not upon the principal of fixtures, but upon the -principle of being
necessary and essential incidents to it, and of no value abstracted
from it. Noneof these articles acquire their legal qualities upon
the principles of a fixture.
A fixture is an article, which was a chattel, but by being physically annexed or affixed to the. realty, became accessory to it and
parcel of it. But the precise point in the connection with the realty, where the article looses the legal qualities of the chattel, and
acquires those of the realty, often presents a question of great
nicety, and sometimes difficult of determination. And a review of
the authorities from the time of the year books, down to the present
period, does not furnish any one established and certain criterion
of universal application, by which this line of demarkation can be
clearly ascertained and pointed out. It may, however, be useful
in the determination of this case, to examine the authorities, and
endeavor to extract from them the most uniform, reasonable and
consistent principle, as a standard by which a fixture can be always
determined.
If there be any thing well settled iil the doctrine of fixtures, it is
this, that to constitute a fixture, it is an essential requisite that
the article be actually affixed, or annexed to the realty. The term
itself imports this. Walker vs. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636. But
the mQde or degree of the annexation which is essential, is a matter
about which the authorities are greatly in conflict. Amos and
Ferard, in their work above referred to, page 2, lay down the rule
as follows: "It is necessary, in order to constitute a fixture, that
that the article ahouldhe let into or united to the l&and, or to substances
ppreviously connected therewith. The manual of Gibbon, and the
work of Grady on Fixtures, are to the same effect. And numerous
adjudicated cases are referred to by these elementary writers,
establishing the same doctrine. A number of the authorities, both
English and American, decide that to give chattels the character
of fixtures, and deprive them of that of personalty, they must be so
firmly affixed to the real estate, that they cannot be removed with-
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out injury to the freehold by the act of removal, and apart from
the abstraction of the thing removed. Parrer vs. Chauffeete, 5
Denio, 837. This doctrine, however, does not furnish a criterion
of uniform application, or one which will bear the test of examination. Mill stones in a mill, and even the waterwheel, and a great
variety of other articles, well established by authority, and universally admitted to be fixtures, may often be removed without any
actual injury to the structure or building, by the act of removal.
Fences, which are undeniably fixtures, and so admitted by all the
authorities referring to them, although actually annexed to and in
connexion with the land, are yet not let into the ground, or fastened
to any thing which is imbedded in the earth. The doors, windows,
window shutters, &c., of a mansion house, may be raised and removed without any actual or physical injury, either to the building
or to the article removed; so also, in a mill, with the mill stones,
hoppers and bolting apparatus, as usually fixed in a mill, yet it has
never been questioned that these articles are fixtures.
There is another class of authorities, in which it is laid down that
the true test of a fixture is the application of the article to the use
or purpose to which the reality is appropriated, however slight its
physical connection with it. Farrer vs. Stackpole, 6 Greenleaf,
157: Gray vs. Holdship, 17 Serg. and Rawle, 413. And some
cases have gone so far as to make this the only test, and even dispense with actual or physical annexation. Voorhee8 vs. Freeman,
2 Watts and Serg. 114; Pyle vs. .Pennock, Ibid. 391.
This rule is in conflict with those authorities which make the
mode of the physical annexation the test, and it will not bear examination as a criterion of general application. If adaptation and
necessity for the use and enjoyment of the reality, be the sole test
of a fixture, then the implements and domestic animals necessary
for the cultivation of a farm, and a great variety of other articles
subjected to the use of the land, or its appurtenances, which never
have been, and never can be recognized as such, would be fixtures.
It would utterly confound the rule by which the rights of the vendor and vendee, heir and executor, &c., have been heretofore
governed.
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In the case of the Despatch Line vs. Billany, 12 New Hampshire R. 205, the Court expressed: the opinion, that actual annexation to the freehold, and adaptation to its purpose, must both unite,
in order to render personal property incident and appurtenant to
real estate.
In some of the authorities, the intention of the party making
the annexation, is laid down as the true test of a fixture. Winslow

vs. The Merchants' Insurance Company., 4 Met. R. 306.
Mr. Dane, in his abridgment of American Law,, vol. iii, page
156, remarks: "It is very difficult to extract from all the cases as
to fixtures in the books, any one principle on which they have been
decided, though being fixed or fastened to the soil, house or freehold,
seems to have been the leading one in some cases, yet not the only
one." And he adds in reference to this matter: "N o t the mere
fixing orfastening is alone to be regarded, but the use nature and
intention."
From the examination which I have been enabled to give to this
subject, and after a careful review of the authorities, I have reached
the conclusion, that the united application of the following requisites will be found the safest criterion of a fixture:
1st. Actual annexation to the reality, or something appurtenant
thereto.
2d. Application to the use or purpose of that part of the reality
with which it is connefted.
3d. The intention of the party making the annexation, to make
the article a permanent accession to the freehold-this intention
being inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation
and situation of the party making the. annexation, the structure
and mode of the anndkation, and the purpose or use for which the
annexation has been made.
This criterion furnishes a test of general and uniform application,
one by which the essential qualities of a fixture can in most instances
be certainly and easily ascertained, and tends to harmonize the
apparent conflict in the authorities relating to the subject. It may
be found inconsistent with the reasoning and, distinctions in many
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of the cases, but it is believed to be at variance with the conclusion
in but few of the well considered adjudications.
Adopting this as the criterion, there will be found no occasion
for giving an ambiguous meaning to the term fixture; no occasion
for denominating an article a fixture at one period of time, which,
with the same annexation, would not be such at another period; no
occasion for determining that to be a fixture as between vendor and
vendee, which, under like circumstances, would not be such as
between landlord and tenant; or finding that to be a fixture, as
between heir and executor, which under like circumstances of
annexation, would not be such as between tenant for life, and
Sturge8 vs. Warren, 11 Vermont
remainderman or reversioner.
Rep. 433. It is true the time of the annexation, and the relation
and situation of the parties, may constitute very important considerations in ascertaining the intention and object in making the
annexation. Why is a tenant for life, or for years, or at will,
favored with the right of removing articles which he attaches to the
land during his term? The Supreme Court of Massachusetts say,
in "Whitingvs. Broaton, 4 Pick. 311: "There seems to be no
doubt, that according to the later decisions in England, and several
cases in our own books, a tenant for life, ydars, or at will, may, at
the expiration of his estate, remove from the freehold all such
improvements as were erected or placed there by him, the removal
of which will not injure the premises, or put them in a worse plight
than they were in when he took possession." All that is required
of a tenant is to leave the land in as good condition as it was when
he received it. When, therefore, a tenant erects expensive structures for carrying on his trade or business, which can be removed
without their destruction or material injury to the freehold, the
presumption is a rational one, that it was not the intention of the
tenant to make them permanent accessions to the freehold, and
thereby donations to the owner of it. The intention of the tenant,
clearly inferable from his situation and relation to the landlord, is
the real foundation of the right of removal, with which he has been
favored. It is true other reasons of great subtlety and considerations of public policy have been frequently assigned for this right
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of removal, but they are doubtless attributable, in some degree, to
a laudable desire on the part of the courts to carry out the real
intention of the party.
It is said that the right of removal must be exercised by the
tenant before the expiration of his term, or, in some cases, within
a reasonable time afterwards; that the tenant can remove things
which he has attached to the'land for the purposes of trade or
manufacture, where not contrary to some prevailing custom, or
where it can be done without material and essential injury to the
freehold, or where the erections inthemselves were strictly chattels
in their nature before they were put up, and can be removed without being entirely demolished, or losing their essential character or
All these
value. Amos & Ferard on Fixtures, pp. 40 and 44.
circumstances furnish considerations bearing upon the intention of
the tenant in making the erections, and their temporary nature
and want of adaptation to the permanent use and enjoyment of the
freehold, and shows the application of the criterion here adopted.
The rule requiring actual or physical annexation to the realty, is
not affected by the few articles sometimes said to belong to the
realty upon the principle of constructiVe annexation, but which, as
has already been observed, are not in fact fixtures, but mere incidents to the freehold, and pass with it upon a different principle
from that of a fixture. But the extent and mode of the annexation
must depend much upon the nature of the article itself, the use to
which it is applied, and other attending circumstances.,
The rule requiring appropriation to the use or purpose of the
In the
realty, was recognized in some of the earliest authorities.
case of Lawton vs. Salmon, 1 H. Black, 259, Lord Mansfield, on
a question between heir and-executor, respecting salt pans attached
to the land, and connected with salt works at a salt spring, declared
the articles fixtures, upon the principle that they were accessories
And it
to the freehold, and necessary to its use and enjoyment.
has been adjudged in numerous cases, that where an article attached
to the realty is accessory to a matter of a personal nature, it should
be considered itself as personalty, and removable as such. Lawton
Where
vs. -Lawton, 3 Atk. 14; Dudley vs. Ward, Ambl. 113.
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articles were attached to the land for the purposes of trade or
manufacture, which purposes were considered matters of a personal
nature, the articles have been declared not to be fixtures. In the
case of .Elwes vs. 3lawe, 3 East. Rep. 54, Lord Ellenborough
reviewed the cases from the time of the year books, and came to
the conclusion that there was a well founded distinction between
articles annexed to the freehold for the purposes of trade or manufacture, and those made for the purposes of agriculture-the right
of removal existing to a much greater extent in case of the former
than in that of the latter. This distinction, however, has been
strongly questioned by high authority in this country. Fan .Nes8
vs. Pacard, 2 Peters' U. S. Rep. 137 ; Whiting vs. Braston, 4
Pick. 310. It was upon this doctrine, which was recognized by
Lord Ellenborough, that the rule was laid down, that articles
annexed to the realty for a mixed purpose of the freehold and of
personalty, were removable, and not fixtures. Hence it is said that
Lord C. B. Comyns, as between heir and executor, decided that a
cider mill firmly fixed in the ground, was accessory to a species of
trade, and, therefore, not a fixture. This distinction, however, as
to articles annexed to the realty for a mixed purpose, does not
appear to have been consistently recognized in this country.
Numerous exceptions to the rule, that whatever is attached to
the realty~becomes a part of it, have been adopted in favor not
only of trade and manufacturing, but also in favor of matters of
ornamental and domestic use. Some of these exceptions have been
based upon public policy, some upon the nature of the article itself,
and some upon the ground of the articles being accessory to matters
of a personal nature, and not strictly subservient to the use and
purposes of the freehold.
But if the third requisite of a fixture here adopted, had been
applied in the numerous cases of exceptions in favor of tenants,
also, in favor of trade and manufacture, and in favor of matters of
ornament and domestic convenience, which fill so much space in
the books, there would have been but little difficulty in determining
that they were not fixtures. In all these cases denominated exceptions, the article could invariably have been removed without
47
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essential injury to the freehold or the article itself. In no case is
a fixture created without the apparent intention of the party
making the annexation, to make a permanent accession to the freehold. And whether articles are personal property or fixtures, must
be determinable, and plainly appear from an inspection of the
property itself, taking into consideration its nature, the mode of
the attachment, the purpose for which used, and the relation of the
party making the annexation, and in some instances, perhaps, other
attending circumstances, indicating either the intention to make it
a mere temporary attachment, or an intention to make a permanent
accession to the realty. And inasmuch as it requires a positive
act on the part of the person making the annexation to change the
nature and legal qualities of a chattel into those of a fixture, the
intention to make the article a permanent accession to the realty,
must affirmatively and plainly appear; and if it be a matter left in
doubt or uncertainty, the legal qualities of the article are not
changed, and the article must be deemed a chattel. In some instances the intention to make the article a fixture, may clearly
appear from the mode of the attachment alone; as where a removal cannot be made without serious injury to the property by
the act of severance. But, where the atachment is but slight, and
does not enter into the physical structure of the realty, this intention must be gathered from the nature of the article and the other
attending circumstances.
The criterion of a fixture above mentioned, must, however, be
subject to qualification in- some respects. Whatever would otherwise be the rights of the parties connected with an article which
has been attached to the realty, they are liable to be controlled by
an established custom or the special agreement of the parties. The
parties are presumed to be cognizant of an existing usage or
custom, and to act with a tacit reference to it. And an article
attached to the land, may be a fixture or a chattel, according to
the special agreement of the parties in relation to it. Naylor vs.
Collings, 1 Taunt. 19; Perry vs. Brown, 2 Stark, 403; -Earlof
Jansfield vs. Blackburn, 6 Bing. N. C. 426.
By an application of the criterion here adopted, to the case
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before the Court, there is no difficulty in determining the character
of the property in controversy. There was here actual connection
with the realty, but it was slight. The bands and straps by which
the machinery was attached to the motive power of the steam
engine and boilers, could easily be thrown off, and the cleats or
means used to keep the machinery steady and in its proper place
for use, were such as to admit of its removal without injury to any
property, or even inconvenience. The use or purpose to which the
machinery was applied, was that of a trade, or the business of
manufacturing, in favor of which the authorities have made numerous exceptions to the principle of fixtures. It may be said that
the building in which the machinery was placed, was parcel of the
freehold, erected and used for the purposes of manufacturing, and
that the machinery was accessory to it, and therefore adapted to
the use to which that part of the realty with which it was connected,
was appropriated. But, in truth, the building itself was rather
the accessory than the principal. It was in fact accessory to the
business or pursuit carried on by the machinery within it, and if
not firmly affixed to or founded in the earth in such manner as to
show it to be a permanent structure, and intended for a permanent
appropriation of that part of the land to which it was attached, it
would be movable property itself. This is supported by high
authority; see .Ewesvs. Mawe, 3 East. 38, and cases there referred
to. The business of manufacturing, it has been said, is a pursuit
personal in its character, and not strictly subservient to real
estate, or essential to the enjoyment of the freehold, or inheritance
in land. Upon this ground, arose the distinction for a time recognized by the Courts, between articles for agricultural purposes, or
those erected for the purposes of trade or manufacture.
I would not be understood as saying that the use to which the
property in controversy in this case was applied, was decisive of its
legal character. A manufacturing establishment, including all its
essential parts, may unite in the same pursuit, and for producing
the same result, portions of real estate with articles of personal
property, retaining all the essential qualities of chattels. In the
various and complex pursuits of man, real estate and chattels are
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very frequently united in their application to the same use, without
either being made accessory to the ,other, while both united are
made subservient to one common use or purpose.
That this machinery was not intended as a permanent accession
to the freehold, and immovable as such, is so clear as scarcely to
call for remark. Neither the mode of the annexation nor the use
to which it was applied, indicated any design to change the character of the property. The nature of the property itself, the customary removal of it from place to place, its liability to be taken
away and disposed of, and other articles of the same kind supplied
to take its place, show that it was not intended to be made a permanent accession to the freehold, and therefore was not covered by
the mortgage, of the complainant.
It has been said that the description in complainant's mortgage,
covered this property, even if it were personalty. It is true, that
where a manufactory or a mill is conveyed and delivered by any
general name or description, which embraces all its essential parts,
as such manufactory or mill, the machinery and all the necessary
parts of the establishment pass, whether affixed to the freehold or
not. Thus, things personal in their nature, but fitted and adapted
to be used with real estate, and essential to its beneficial enjoyment
in such use, may pass with the realty by a conveyance and delivery
under such a description, which would pass by an ordinary conveyance of the land With its appurtenances. But in this case, the
language in complainant's mortgage: " on wich is erected a woolen
manufactory," added to the description of the mortgaged premises
by the number of the lot, &c., is descriptive of the realty merely..
It is claimed, on the part of the compainant, that the common
law rule as to fixtures, has been somewhat changed'by the progress
of society, and the advancerent in the application of machinery to
the purpose of manufactures, so as to create a different criterion of
a fixture in a manufactory or a mill, from that which applies to
articles attached to the realty under other circumstances. And
upon this ground, it is claimed that all the essential parts of a mill
or manufactory, whether actually attached to the realty or not,
become fixtures, and as such, pass by a conveyance of the freehold.
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This doctrine, which seems to have been recognized in several of
the States, derives its origin chiefly from the cases of Farrervs.
Stacpole, 6 Greenleaf's Rep. 154, and Voorhis vs. Freeman, 2
Watts & Serg. 116. The former case does not sustain the position
assumed. That was trover for a mill chain, dogs and bars attached
to a saw mill. The plaintiff claimed the property by virtue of a
deed conveying a " saw mill with the privilegesand appurtenances,"
upon the grounds: 1st, that the articles, whethcr chattels or fixtures, formed essential parts of the saw mill, and passed by the
sale and conveyance of it as such; 2d, that they were parts of
the saw mill, and went with it by general and uniformf usage. The
Court below ruled against the plaintiff on the first ground, but left
the case on the second ground to the jury, which found for the
plaintiff. This judgment was sustained by the Supreme Court, yet
expressing an opinion a variance with the Court below, as to the
first ground. Although some of the reasoning in this case was
intended to show that the articles in question were fixtures, yet all
that was settled by the adjudication, was that the articles, whether
fixtures or chattels, passed as essential parts of the saw mill, and
its appurtenances conveyed as such.
The case of Voorhis vs. Freeman, although professedly based on
the principle settled in the case in the State of Maine, goes' still
further, and determines that machinery, which is a constituent part
of a manufactory, to the purlposes of which the building has been
adapted, and without which it would cease to be such manufactory,
is part of the freehold, although not actually affixed to it, or in
physical connection with it. This case vas trover for the conversion of one hundred and six soft and chilled rolls belonging to the
machinery of an iron rolling mill in the City of Pittsburg. The
plaintiff claimed under a sale on execution as chattel property, and
the defendant under a previous sale under a levarifaciason a mortgage in which the premises were described as "a lot of ground with
one iron rolling mill establishment situate thereon, with the building, apparatus,steam engine, boilers, bellows, fc., attached to the
said establishment." And the questions simply were, whether the
rolls were real or personal property; and if the latter, whether

742,

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

they did not pass by the descriptive terms of the mortgage. The
Court held, that if chattels, the articles would have passed by force
of the word "apparatus" in the description of the premises. But
Chief Justice Gibson, reaching the conclusion, that "no distinctive
principle pervades the cases universally on the subject of fixtures,"
repudiates the criterion of physical attachment as limited in its
range, and productive of contradiction, adopts the doctrine of constructive attachment, and attempts to establish a new criterion on
the ground of public policy, as applicable to the machinery and
implements in a manufactory. The only authority referred to by
the learned Chief Justice, which even tends to sustain him, is the
case of Farrervs. Stackpole, and instead of explaining how this
new class of fixtures is to become incorporated into the realty, and
acquire its nature and incidents, he endeavors to maintain his position upon the ground of public policy, holding that it would be
"ruinous to the manufacturer in Pennsylvania,where a statute
directs that real estate shall not be sold on execution before the
rents, issues and profits shall have- been found insufficient to satisfy
the debt in seven years," to allow a "a suffering creditor," to seize
on execution the loose machinery and implements in a mill, and
thus interrupt "a thriving business." Such is the principle of
public policy, by which loose and movable property is to be made
parcel of the freehold, and subjected to what remains of the more
permanellt and unbending rules of the feudal tenure. The reasoning of Chief Justice Gibson would be allowable if legitimate, but it
is not certainly legitimate in settling the incidents of property real
or personal, in a Court of Justice. Courts have generally declared
it to be the policy of the law, to guard against all obstacles in the
way of creditors. And this is, perhaps, the first instance in which
movable droperty was, by constructive annexation, adjudged parcel
of the realty, for the avowed reason that it ought to be placed beyond the convenient reach of the legal process of creditors.
To what consequences would such a criterion lead, if fully carried
out? A cabinet maker erects a building for a cabinet shop, and
furnishes it with all the necessary machinery, implements, tools,
&c., for an establishment for the manufacture of furniture, some of
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which may be attached to the building. All the machinery, tools,
implements, &c., whether actually attached to the building or not,
and essential and necessary for the business of the establishment to
which the building is adapted, and without which it would not be a
perfect and complete establishment of the kind, would be parcel of
the freehold. The application of the same rule would convert the
benches and essential implements of the shoe maker's shop, the
vices, hammers and machinery of the coppersmith and tinner, and
manufacturers, into reality. And inasmuch as some carry on their
business on a much larger scale than others, a question of no little
difficulty would arise as to the quantity of the loose implements and
machinery which should be deemed essential to make it a complete
establishment, and what might be rejected as unessential, and therefore chattels.
It may be inconvenient to the mechanic or the manufacturer, to
have the movable implements and machinery in his shop taken
away upon execution. The same inconvenience, however, may be
experienced by the agriculturist, who may be prevented from putting in his crops by a similar removal of his team or farming
utensils.
Several decisions have been subsequently made in Pennsylvania,
and also in some of the other States, recognizing the doctrine of
the case of Voorhis vs. Freeman,but the great weight of authority,
both in England and in the United States, is against it.
We are told by Lord Hardwicke, in the case of Lawton vs.
Lawton, 3 Atk. 15, that since the time of Henry the Seventh, the
Courts have, from considerations of public policy, been relaxing
the strict construction of the law relating to fixtures, and that
many articles attached to the realty are now movable, which
formerly were considered parcel of the freehold. The progress 'of
society and improvements in business and commerce, have constantly tended to unfetter property, and especially all movable
property, from the rigid rules of the feudal tenure. And no
sound considerations of 'public policy can justify any retrograde
change in the legal qualities of any kind of movable property by
constructive attachment to the freehold, for the purpose of favoring,
any one particular pursuit or business.
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Swift vs. Ttompson, 9 Conn. R. 63, is a leading case in Connecticut, in which it was decided that the machinery of a cotton
factory, consisting partly of implements in no way attached to the
building, and partly of spinning frames standing upon the floor, and
kept in their places by cleats about their feet, nailed to' the floor,
and partly. of other machinery fastened by wood screws passing
into the floor, all of which could be removed without injury to the
building or machinery, was personal property.
The case of Gale vs. Ward, 14 Mass. R. 352, is a leading case
in Massachusetts, in which it was held that carding machines in a
woolen factory, not nailed to the floor, nor in any manner attached
to the building, except by the leather band which passed over the
wheel or pulley to give motion to the machines, which band could
be slipped off by hand, and was taken -off, and the machines removed from time to time, when repaired, were personal property.
Each one of these machines was so heavy as to require four men
to move it on the floor, and too large to be taken out at the door,
but so constructed as to be easily unscrewed and taken in pieces.
In deciding this case, PARKER, Ch. J. said: " They must be considered as personal property, because, although in some sense
attached to thefreehold, yet they could easily be disconnected, and
were capable of being used in any other building erected for similar
purposes. It is true that the relaxation of the ancient doctrine respecting fixtures, has been in favor of tenants against landlords;
but the principle is correct iuevery point of view."
It has been said that the authority of this case was somewhat
shaken by the case of Winslow vs. The Merchants' insurance
Company, 4 Metcalf's R. 306, in which a steam engine, boilers,
&c., and other machinery adapted to be removed by'them and connected with them, were decided to be fixtures. But from the
peculiar structure of this machinery, the mode of its annexation as
well as its adaptation to the use of the building, the Court determined that it was permanent in its character, and intended as an
accession to the realty. And SIAW, Ch. J., in giving the opinion
of the Covrt, expressly refers to this case of Gale vs. Ward, in
terms of approval.
In the case of Cresson vs. Stout, 17 Johns R. 116, Mr. Justice
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expressed the opinion that frames in a factory for spinning
flax and tow, though fastened by upright pieces extending to the
upper fl"por, and cleats nailed to the floor round the feet, would not
be considered fixtures.
In Sturges vs. Warren, 11 Vermont R. 433, machinery in a
woolen factory, affixed to the building in the usual manner, with
nails, screws and cleats, was determined to be personal property.
The same principle was settled in Trapps vs. Hfarter, 3 Tyrwhitt's R. 604, and in Duck vs. Braddyl, McLelland, 217; 13
Price, 455.
Walker'vs. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636, is a leading case in New
York, in which it -was decided, after a very full review of the authorities, that the removable parts of the machinery of a woolen factory,
consisting of two double carding machines, a picking machine,
shearing machine, spinning machine, looms, &c., were personal
property. In this case, it was conceded that the other machinery
of the factory, consisting of the water wheel, fulling mill, dye,
kettle, press and tenter bars, were fixtures or parcel of the realty.
The recent cases of Tranderpeel vs. Van Allen, 10 Bar. S. C.
Rep. 157, and Buckley vs. Buckley et al., 11 Bar. S. 0. Rep. 43,
decided in New York, are not understood as varying the doctrine
laid down in the case of Walker vs. Sherman, and Cresson vs.
Stout.
Substantially the same ground has been taken in the State of
Indiana. In the case of Taffee vs. Warwick, 3 Blackf. 111, it was
held that a carding machine situated in a. building erected for the
purpose of carrying on the carding business, standing on the floor
in its usual place of operation, but not fastened to the building, is
personal property. And in Sparks vs. The State Bank, 7 Blackf.
469, it was held that a steam engine and boiler placed on a stone
foundation, with a brick chimney at one end of the boiler, situated
in a tan-yard, to facilitate the business of tanning, and used for
several years, but not so fixed but that they could be removed without injury to the building, with which they were connected by
braces, were fixtures.
Fixtures in a manufacturing establishment, must be governed by
PLATT
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the same criterion which applies to fixtures in other situations.
The machinery and implements in such an establishment, although
useful and even essential for the business carried on, which are not
permanently affixed to the ground or the structure of the building,
and which can be -easily removed without material injury to the
building or the articles themselves, and their place supplied by
other articles of a similar kind, are not fixtures, but personal
property. But that portion of the machinery in such an establishment which is firmly affixed to the earth, or to the structure of the
building, and which, from its nature, mode df attachment, use and
the relative situation of the party placing it there, was plainly
intended to be permanent, is parcel of the freehold.
The question as to the steam engine and boilers, is not directly
involved in-this case, the Court not being called upon by the defendants to interfere with the judgment of May Term for the sale of
the mortgaged premises, from which no appeal was taken. The
application of the principle, however, adopted in this case, (in the
absence of any established custom or special agreement of the parties to the contrary,) plainly shows these articles to have been fixtures,
and therefore parcel of the mortgaged premises. They were bolted
and permanently fixed upon timbers, and stone and brick foundations
laid in the earth, which were erected for them. The building
itself was permanent, and designed an4 used for a manufactory,
and these articles of a ponderous character adapted to the production of the motive power of the establishment, were firmly affixed
to the structure of that portion of the freehold appropriated to
the purposes of the business, and clearly intended to be permanent. This is sustained .by the case of Allison vs. .tcCurre, 15
Ohio Rep. 729, where the Court determined that a steam engine
set on timbers laid on raised walls on the top of the ground, was a
fixture; and in the same case, the machinery of a grist and saw
mill attached by coupling shafts, drivers and straps, shown to be
placed there for permanent use, were adjudged to be parcel of the
freehold. And to the same effect, in the case of Powellvs. Monson
and Brimfield Manufacturing Company, 3 Mason's R. 347, in
which Mr. Justice Story has elaborately examined the subject of
fixtures.
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If it were necessary, for the purpose of sustaining the dissolution of the injunction by the Common Pleas, we should further
hold that the parties having treated the property in controversy as
personalty by the execution of the chattel mortgage and other
acts, showing that the articles were not intended to be made fixtures, the complainant could not now have a decree for them as having been parcel of the freehold.
III. The injunction having been properly dissolved as to a part
of the property only, and that too which had not diminished in
value in consequence of the injunction, and which was sold on execution afterwards, and the proceeds of the sale applied upon the
judgments of the defendants, no decree should have been rendered
against the complainant for the amount of the balance of said
judgments at law, and the penalty.
The complainant having properly appealed, it is ordered that
the defendants, in whose favor the decree was taken in the Common
Pleas, pay the costs accruing on the appeal, and that the cause be
remanded.
Boswell Marsh, Attorney for Complainant.
Stanton It McCook, Attorneys for judgment creditors of Hewitt,
and B. S. Moody for other respondents.
Louisville Chancery Court, Kentucky.
PRAGOFF vs. HESLEP AND OTHERS.
1. Co-owners of Ships and Steamboats. Their liens for sums advanced in payment
for the construction of the vessel.
2. If they unite in building the vessel for the purpose of conducting a joint trade,
in the carrying of merchandise, passengers, etc., to divide profits and. suffer losses
as partners do, unless there is some controlling circumstance, each part-owner
has a lien on the ship, or steamboat, for such adiances; and will have a preference over general creditors of the other part-owners; but not against purchasers
of the others' shares, without notice.
3. Remarks on the cases of Doddington vs. Hallet, and Ezparte Young.
4. Some of the distinctions between partners and part-owners.

The opinion of the Court, in which the facts fully appear, was
delivered by
PIRTLE, CH.-This is an attachment sued out by the plaintiff, against
the interest of the defendant, Heslep, in the steamboat Cornelia. A
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bond was given by the .owners, who have since sold the boat, for a
full price; and the dispute is now about the proceeds of the sale.
It is alleged, in behalf of the other owners, that the boat was built
by them and Heslep in partnership, and that Ileslep did not pay
his proportion of the price of the building of the boat, but is in debt
to them in a large sum, for money advanced for that purpose. The
books of the boat show, according to the testimony, that "Heslep
had drawn from said boat, his entire interest in said boat and
$1,450 over and above said interest, after giving him credit for his
services &c.," for he had been master of the boat.
Heslep, in his answer, says that he owned, at the date of the attachment, thirty-four sixtieths of the boat, "subject to the payment
of her building and running debts. Said boat was built in partnership by respondent and his co-defendants, and she has been run by
defendants in partnership."
The proof shows that the proceeds of the sale of the boat have
been applied to the payment of its debts, and that there is the sum
of $2,700 still due for the building of the boat. Heslep is alleged
to be insolvent, but there is no proof of this. The attachment was
sued out upon the ground that he had no property in the State
known to the plaintiff, but the interest in the boat, which was about
to be removed.
Heslep says he had two slaves at that time hired on the boat.
As to the insolvency or solvency, the parties would stand about 6n
even ground, if that could rule the case.
A part owner may have, a'lien for advances where there is a
partnership; and there may be a partnership in a steamboat, or it
may be partnership property as well as any chattel. This is so
well acknowledged that it would be useless to quote any thing to
prove it.
But the question of importance and difficulty is, whether there
can be a lien, such as for a partner, where there is not that kind
of association and holding of the property in the manner in which
mercantile partnerships are constituted; and as property, such as
goods, articles in trade or manufacture, are held in buying and selling, and in carrying on the manufacture &c. There is no proof
of a regular partnership in this case. The interest which part-
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owners have been held to have in ships, f6r a long time back, and
before the invention of steamboats; is that of tenants in common
and not joint-tenants; because, for the sake of commerce, they were
to be deemed mercantile propertyso far as that the Jus accre8cendi
should not attach to them.
Part-owners are, as Pothier calls them, quasi partners.
For the sake of trade, and to encourage men to unite their capital and industry in building and running boats, may not this policy,
that made them commercial property so far, be carried still further,
-may they not be treated as partnership property is treated, for
the purpose of securing the co-owner, who has advanced money
beyond his share in the building of the boat? A lien is given to
partners respectively to secure them in all that is due them from
the concern, on account of the relation to each other; the good
faith demanded; the manner in which they hold; and the public
policy that encourages trade. These are the reasons.-Our steamboat owners are not partners in the technical sense; they cannot
sell the shares of each other ; no one has power to dispose of the
boat; they cannot bind each other as far as partners in the trade
of buying and selling, or of manufacture, can; and there are other
relations of partners which they have not. But does all this imply
that they should not have an equitable right superior to others, to
be secured in the disbursements they make for each other in the
building of the steamboat ? If several persons unite in building a
steamboat for the purpose of conducting a joint trade in the carrying of merchandise, passengers, &c., to divide profits, and suffer
losses as partners do; it seems to me that the building of the boat
is to be deemed a part of, and the foundation and commencement of
their joint trading; and that there is just the same reason for giving
one of them a lien for advancements in the building, as there would
be in the instance of the common partnership in merchandise, as
long as a purchaser without notice is not concerned.
I do not say that this would be the case where a joint business
in trade was not contemplated, but where the boat might be built to
be chartered or let out. Ordinarily, part-owners of a ship, or steamboat, are not deemed partners. The relation of partners is an
exception and must be specially shown, 3 Kent, 155. This is true
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enough; but what does it mean ? It means, there must be proof
beyond the fact'of mere part-ownership, to make a partnership so
that one may.sell the ship or boat; that a lien shall exist for a
,balance, against a purchaser without notice; that a power shall
exist in one to bind the owners of other shares, beyond the power
of mere part owners, &c.
In the case, of Doddington vs. ifallet, 1 Ves. Sr., 497, Lord
Hardwicke decided that there was a partnership so far forth as that
a lien should be given the part owners for money advanced in the
fitting out, &c., of the ship. The case was this: "An agreement
was entered into by and between the plaintiffs and Thomas Hall,
empowering him to contract and agree for the building of a ship
for them for the services of the East India Company, and for the
fitting. out, managing and victualing with [a contract between Hall
and them] to pay proportional shares according to the several parts
of the money, and all the charges and disbursements in equiping"
&c. The suit was to subject Hall's share, in preference to his
general creditors. Lord Hardwicke said, "It must be admitted,
the ship may be the subject of partnership as well as any thing else;
the use and earnings thereof being proper subjects of trade, and the
letting a ship to freight as much a trade as any other. Then it
appears plainly to be a partnership among them, and the ship itself
to be part of the subject thereof, which was to be let to freight to
the company, it being their method of trading. The foundation
of this partnership stock is the .ship itself, which must be employed,
and the earnings and profits to arise."
This case has been treated as overruled in the modern English
books, and by Kent. But it does not stand overruled in this State.
How did it come to be considered overruled? Mr; Abbott, in his
work on Shipping, had said, "It seems to have been considered that
part owners might have a lien on each other's shares of a ship, as
partners in trade have on each other's shares of their merchandise.
But I do not find this point to have been ever decided, and there is
a material difference between the two cases. Partners are at law
joint-tenants of their merchandise; one may dispose of the whole
property. But part-owners are tenants in common of a ship. One
cannot sell the share of another. And if this general lien exists, it
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must prevail against a purchaser, even without notice, which does
not seem consistent with the nature of the interest of a tenant in
common. It is true, indeed, that as long as the ship continues to
be employed by the same persons, none can be permitted to partake
of the profits, until all that is due, in respect to the part he holds
in the ship, has been discharged. But as one part-owner cannot
compel another to sell the ship, there does not appear to be any
mode by which he can enforce against the other's share of the ship
in specie, the payment of his part of the expenses." In the case of
Ex parte Young, 2 Yes. & Beam. 242, Lord Eldon says :"The difficulty in this case arises upon the decision of Doddington vs. Hfallet, by Lord Hardwicke, which is directly in point. That
case is questioned by Mr. Abbott, who doubts what would be done
with it at this day; and I adopt that doubt. The case which is given
by Mr. Abbott from the Register's Book, is a clear decision by Lord
lfardwicke, that part-owners of a ship, being tenants in common,
and not joint-tenants, have a right, notwithstanding, to use in partnership, and consider that as a chattel, liable as partnership effects,
to pay all debts whatever, to which any of them are liable on account of the ship. This opinion went the length, that the tenant
There is great difficulty upon
in common had a right to a sale.
that case, and the inclination of my judgment is against it. But it
would be a very strong act for me, by an order in bankruptcy, from
which there is no appeal, to reverse a decree made by Lord Hardwick in a case." He says, "there is no decision in equity contradicting that."
In a note to 2 Rose Rep. 78, Lord Eldon says, "Doddington
vs. .allet, I know from a MSS. note, to have been Lord Hardwicke's deliberate judgment. In a case of joint property I admit
there cannot be much difficulty." "I have no doubt that freight is
liable to the joint demands. As to the ship, it stands upon the
nice distinction of a tenancy in common.
Lord Eldon seems to have been deluded by Mr. Abbott, (Lord
Tenterden) and Mr. Abbott deluded himself by looking at the old
common law as to tenants in common, and the distinction between
them and joint-tenants, and the, rights and powers of partners,
strictly so called; and the rights and powers of part-owners, as laid
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down by Lord Hardwicke, and for the purpose stated, and by comparing them as he (Abbott) compared the others. He had forgotten
that a part owner of even an equal interest was deemed a tenant in
common only for the encouragement of trade, that there might be
no survivorship; and that, if one tenant in 'common could not sell
the share of another, this did not, for a moment, prove that the same
equity did not exist with them, and the same policy apply, where
the relations between them in faith and business were the same as if
they were called joint-tenants.
That one part-owner has not the power to sell, has no more to
do with the question, than to say one partner has not the right to
destroy, and therefore he shall have a lien! He might well, indeed,
be deemed entitled to a preference in equity, (without any legal"
right,) and might be looked upon as -a partner is looked upon for
such purpose, and yet have no power to sell, because the object
of the joint concern is not- to sell, but to keep and run the boat..
Another delusion of Mr. Abbott: he says, "And if this general
lien exists, it must prevail against a purchaser, even without
notice." Now this position was expressly excluded by Lord Hardwicke in the case of IDoddington vs. Hallet; and surely it is
no argument against the application of the lien, where there is
no purchaser without notice, because it would not be right to
extend it to property in the hands of such a purchaser. His
argument is, that as partners out and out cannot assign their
shares, so as to put a purcha.ser in a better condition than themselves, and as one tenant in common cannot sell the share of another,
theiefore there can be no equity afforded between part-owners
Even Lord Eldon is carried
as there may be between partners!
away by "a nice distinction of a tenancy in corwmon." This is
really surprising. It might have been -thought that it would be
carrying the doctrine, so salutary and naturally honest as to partners, too far when it reached part-owners; but surely it is difficult
to perceive any convincing good sense when a Chancellor tells us it
cannot be done, because one is a joint-tenancy and the other is a
Because part-owners are not partners for
tenancy in common.
every purpose, I repeat, it does not follow that none of the relations
rights and equities. of partners belong to their condition. Most of
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those who have withheld these rights and equities, have done so on
grounds as artificial as those of Lord Tenterden or Lord Eldonbecause they were found not to be partners in toto, therefore they
could be partners in nothing, or for no purpose.
In Avicoll vs. ,flmford, 4 Johns Chy. Rep. 522, Chancellor Kent
followed the case ex parte Young : but this decision was reversed,
and the decision of Lord Hardwicke in Doddington vs. iallet,was
approved; 20 Johns Rep. 611. The case in 6 Pick. 46, does not
examine the question, but treats the matter as ruled against Hardwicke's opinion.
The case of Knox vs. Campbell, 1 Penn. State Rep. by Barr,
367; and the case of Hopkins vs. Forsyth, 14 Penn. Rep. 38; and
the case of Patterson vs. Chalmers, 7 B. Mon. 598, are not decisions which may not stand with the case of Doddington vs. Hallet,
and with what is contended for in this case. They use the general
language about part-owners being tenants in common, &c., but do
not decide the question now before the Court; and very different
questions were before the respective Courts in those cases. In
Gilpin's Rep. 460, Patton vs. The Bandolph, Judge Hopkinson
mentioned the case ex parte Young with approbation; but the
question here was not before him; nor was it necessary to decide
that Hardwicke should give way to Eldon.
In the case of -Hewitt vs. Sturdevant, 4 Ben. Monroe, 453, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky expressly approve the decision of
Lord Hardwicke.
They say, "the decision of Lord Hardwicke as applicable to the
facts of the case before him, seems to us to be founded on the clearest
principles of equity. The facts of the case before him justified the
determination only, and he can be regarded as deciding, though
his reasoning went further, that the administrator of an intestate
part-owner of a ship, had not a right to take his share and apply
it to the claims of his general creditors, free from the cost and
expenses incurred by a co-builder and fitter out of the vessel, over
his share, but he was entitled to a lien on the vessel for his excess
of advances, settled upon the principles of a partnership as to the
building and fitting out."
48
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"And what reason, propriety, or justice, would there be in
allowing'a general creditor to receive and 'bear away the proceeds
of that part or-interest in a ship, which .ras in part, or whole, built,'
erected and rendered valuable, by the extra advances of a co-builder,
and which might never have existed or been made valuable, but for
those extra advances ?"

In Smith= vs. DeSilva, Cowp. Rep. 471, Lord Mansfield and the
whole Court, applied to part-owners the doctrine settled by the case
of iS7kipp vs. Wed, 1 Yes. Senr. 239, that between partners there is
a lien for a balance. This case is referred to with approbation in
the, case of .fewitt vs. Sturdevant.
By the common law, one part-owner, or a majority of part-owners,
could not bind others for expenses of repairs, without consent
expressed or implied. This was not the general commercial law,
but it was the law of England. Story on Part. sec. 421, 427. The
implication of consent was very easily made, and now it is presumed
as a general rule, unless the contrary appears. Such is the advancement of the law as society moves on.
It is not hard to presume a consent on the part of co-builders of
steamboats and ships, that their shares shall stand bound to their
co-owners, till their over advances are paid off. There are few
cases, ind~ed, where the parties have built with the intention of a
continued association in the carrying trade, that this understanding
has not been had, expressed or implied. It is now a rule, safe to
be made on the implication, .hat in the absence of controlling
circumstances, part-owners do not intcnd to rely solely upon the
personal responsibility of each other to reimburse themselves for
expenses and charges incurred upon the common property, for the
common benefit; but that there is a mutual understanding, that
they shall possess a li~n in rem. Story on Part. see. 444, agrees
with this position. I shall dismiss the attachment. The other
owners have a preference over Heslep's general creditors.
Tyler for Plaintiff-Rte]py for Defendant.

